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I. INTRODUCTION
It has perhaps never been more important than it is now for
law professors to exhort their students to evaluate the tensions
that emerge when assertions of religious liberty come into
conflict with competing interests like societal welfare, civil
rights, or third party interests. As a professor of Employment
Law and Employment Discrimination Law, I familiarize my
students with the claims that may be brought by employees in a
variety of scenarios in which they are alleging religious
discrimination, asserting a right to a reasonable accommodation,
or otherwise affected by someone else's claim of the same. The
adjudication of these claims, whether brought pursuant to the
U.S. Constitution, 1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 or
another statute, necessitates an evaluation of the relative weight
to be accorded to the interests on both sides.
I also teach my students about allegations of employers'
disability discrimination and failure to reasonably accommodate
an employee's disability under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), which mandates a reasonable accommodation for an
otherwise qualified disabled employee. 3 This short piece details
an approach that I have taken toward teaching the concept of
reasonable accommodation across contexts, while noting the
critical differences between the standards applied, the policy and
other considerations at issue under each statute, and the
legislative and jurisprudential goals at stake in each scenario. It
lays out the materials that I introduce as well as the approach
that I take.
II.BACKGROUND

Title VII renders it "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or
employment, because of such individual's ... religion," among
other protected classes. 4 Section 2000eG) of Title VII defines the
term "religion" as including "all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate ... [a] religious
1.
2.
3.
4.

See generally U.S. Const. amend. I.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1964).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112a-b (2012).
42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2012).

2018]

RELIGION AND DISABILITY ACCOMODATION

249

observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business." 5
The ADA, for its part, prohibits an employer from
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability
• • • •" 6
The Act goes so far as to define "discrimination" as
including
an
employer's
"not
making
reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified ... employee, unless [the employer] can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of [its] business." 7 As per the EEOC,
"an accommodation is any change in the work environment or in
the way things are customarily done that enables an individual
with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." 8
There are three types of reasonable accommodations. 9 The first
type is a "modification or adjustment to a job application
process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be
considered for the position such qualified applicant desires." 10
The second type consists of "modifications or adjustments to the
work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under
which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that
enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the
essential functions of that position." 11 The third type consists of
"modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges
of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated
employ-..:es without disabilities." 12
Examples of reasonable accommodations in the ADA
include: making existing facilities accessible; job restructuring;
part-time or modified work schedules; acquiring or modifying
equipment; changing tests, training materials, or policies;
providing qualified readers or interpreters; and reassignment to
a vacant position.13

•

•

5.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
8. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodations and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
(2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [https://perma.cc/67RFLXT3] [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance).

6.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(i) (1997)).
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (1997)).
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(iii) (1997)).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i-ii) (1997).
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Interestingly, whereas under Title VII, the "undue
hardship" defense has been read as a demonstration that the
proposed accommodation inflicts more than a "de minimis" cost
or burden on the employer, 14 the ADA's undue hardship analysis
asks whether the employer is forced to incur a "significant
difficulty or expense." 15
Both analyses involve competing interests and a holistic
evaluation of the job at the employing entity, in terms of both
what it does and does not necessarily entail. 16 Obviously, when
it comes to a reasonable accommodation mandate, wholesale
deference to either side's framing of what is reasonable to ask for
and what the essential functions of the position are would beg
the question, so a court must delve into these fact-intensive
queries with a searching, self-directed approach.17 At the end of
the day, the statutes will operate to compel change and
adjustment in some cases, but not in others, and these changes
will potentially impact not only the employee and employer, but
third parties, like co-workers, customers, and society as a
whole. 18 Adjudicating reasonable accommodation claims in any
context thus necessitates, I believe, a step back to ask the larger
question of what we aim to accomplish, for example, when we
allow a statute or other law to be successfully wielded by an
employee seeking an accommodation that will enable her to do
her job. It is important, when teaching antidiscrimination law,
that each statute's objectives, limitations, and capabilities be
explored, both individually and, in comparison with one another,
to solidify and cement understanding.

Ill. PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH
Any discussion of reasonable accommodation 1s best
14. See e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66, 84 (1977) ("To
require an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [employee
his Sabbath day] off is an undue hardship ....").
15. See Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1996);
Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Md., 923 F. Supp. 720, 740 (D. Md. 1996);
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 8; see also Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1, 7 (1996) (acknowledging that unlike the narrow interpretation of what
constitutes an "undue hardship" by the Court in TWA, "[r]easonable accommodation
... means something very different in the context of disabilities law ....").
16. Stephen Gee, The "Moral Hazards" of Title VII's Religious Accommodation
Doctrine, 89 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1131, 1138-39 (2014).
17. Id. at 1147.
18. Id. at 1156, 1158.
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grounded in the policy surrounding the law itself (statutes
mandating nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodation)
and the competing interests of those potentially affected by
another's accommodation, whether that be a colleague, a client
or patient of the employer, or the general public.1 9 To the extent
that case law and legislative history d,o not amply delve into the
tensions engendered by these competing rights, interests, and
considerations, legal scholarship is helpful as well. 20 What is the
precise nature of the relationship between an accommodation
that is simply not reasonable and one that confers an undue
hardship on an employer? What is the evidentiary threshold
and proper considerations when establishing either one?
Much has been made over the fact that the reasonable
accommodation provision afforded to private employees alleging
religious discrimination in violation of Title VII has,
traditionally, been read as somewhat narrower and conferring
less upon these plaintiffs than, for example, the reasonable
accommodation provision of the ADA. 21 My class typically covers
the ADA after we have covered Title VII, so when students
confront the reasonable accommodation provision in the ADA, it
is not the first time that they are examining the analysis, theory,

19. Trans World Airlines, 423 U.S. at 85 ("[T]he paramount concern of Congress
in enacting Title VII was the elimination of discrimination in employment." Thus,
"[i]n the absence of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, we
will not readily construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate against
some employees in order to enable others to obserue their Sabbath.") (emphasis
added).
20. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 11-12 (analyzing the contours of
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship); Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a
Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue"
Under the American with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 433 (1995)
(analyzing the undue hardship under the ADA); Russel H. Gardner & Carolyn J.
Campanella, The Undue Hardship Defense to the Reasonable Accommodation
Requirement of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 7 LAB. L. 37, 37-38 (1991)
(analyzing the relationship of the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
defense); Harvey S. Mars, An Oueruiew of Title I of the American With Disabilities
Act and its Impact Upon Federal Labor Law, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 251, 259-66
(1995) (analyzing both the reasonable accommodation requirement and the undue
hardship defense of the ADA); Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer's Duty to
Accommodate Employee Religious Practices Under Title Vll A~er Ansonia u. Board of
Education u. Philbrook, 50 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 513 (1989) (analyzing the relationship
between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in the religious context);
Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAA, 14 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. &
PUB. P0L'Y 509, 513-14 (2011); Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped:
An Examination of the Different Application's of the Reasonable-Accommodation
Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745, 762 (1998).
21. Zablotsky, supra note 20, at 534.
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or jurisprudence of reasonable accommodation in the workplace.
By the time we get to the reasonable accommodation portion of
the ADA, I am anxious to remind the students about Title VII
and ask them about the treatment of reasonable accommodation
across the two statutes. What follows are some of the topics,
questions, and approache$ that guide our ensuing discussion, as
well as some of the sources and materials that I use.
Once we have looked at some reasonable accommodation
cases in both contexts, we discuss how representative cases
provide data points that help to contour dividing lines and even
implicit standards embedded in the jurisprudence. 22 With a
sense of how the lines tend to be drawn slightly more generously
when it comes to affording reasonable accommodations to
employees under the ADA, we proceed to backtrack to the mere
fact that religion, and no other protected class is afforded
accommodation. I touch upon, briefly, the notion that other
protected classes, like race, sex, and national origin, have
generated discussion of why reasonable accommodation may be
beneficial, 23 and the fact that only discrimination ''because of'
religion has been defined by Title VII as failing to grant a
reasonable accommodation. 24
I encourage my students to think about what distinguishes
religion from other protected classes. We discuss the First
Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 25 We
also discuss how the passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the special tax status afforded religious
institutions illustrates how pervasively the U.S. government
privileges religion across contexts, seeming to consider it (pardon
the pun) sacrosanct and special, even vis-a-vis other protected
class statuses. 26 As Professor Stanley Fish has said:
22. Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and
the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 389-90 (2008).
23. Id. at 418 ("propos[ing] that employers be required to provide
accommodation for appearance traits that an employee (or applicant) claims signal
identification with a subgroup recognized by Title VII, such as race, sex, or national
origin."); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom
and Antidiscrimination. Norms, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1, 66 n.366 (2007) ("Although
scholars sometimes assume that the antidiscrimination rules of Title VII and
accommodation mandates are fundamentally different, . . . the two overlap in
important respects and that certain aspects of Title VII, including its disparate
impact
prong,
sometimes
require
accommodation.");
Christine
Jolls,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 667 (2001).
24. Gee, supra note 16, at 1135.
25. U.S. CONST. amend I.
26. Gee, supra note 16, at 1139.
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[B]y definition religion sees itself as above secular
norms, although the issue of being exempt from those
norms is a vexed one, occupying the territory
between "render unto Caesar what is Caesar's" and
"no one can serve two masters." The entire point of
religion - at least of the theistic kind, Christianity,
Judaism, Islam - is to affirm a fidelity to an
authority and to a set of imperatives that exceed, and
sometimes clash with, what is required by the state.
The denial of religion's claim to be special is the
denial of religion as an ultimate discourse, and is, in
effect, the denial of religion as religion; it becomes
just one more point of view. 27
What generally comes next is a side-by-side view of the ADA
and Title VII. As one scholarly article recites:
The . . . (ADA) differs fundamentally from Title
VIL Both prohibit something called "discrimination,"
but discrimination under the ADA means something
quite distinct from what it means under Title VIL
Under Title VII and other antidiscrimination
statutes, employers can safely make employment
decisions if they ignore race and other protected
statuses and focus solely on criteria related to
productivity.... At issue here are the basic models of
discrimination. The central thrust of Title VII
employs a "sameness" model of discrimination,
requiring employers to treat African Americans and
women exactly the same as others; their race and sex
must be ignored and employers must focus instead on
factors related to productivity. Although the ADA
uses a sameness model in part, its distinctive thrust
is a "difference" model, requiring employers to treat
individuals with disabilities differently and more
favorably than others. Employers must treat
individuals with disabilities as qualified if they "can
perform the essential functions" of the job. Employers
are free to treat others as qualified only if they can
perform all of the functions of the job. Similarly,
27. Stanley Fish, Is Religion Speci.al? N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 26, 2010),
https://opinionator.bliogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/is-religion-special/?mcubz=3
[https://perma.cdSV3M-L9EQ].
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employers must make "reasonable accommodations"
for individuals with disabilities. 28
Thus, as the article concludes, when it comes to
accommodation and deference, "[u]nder Title VII ... law, the
employer defines the job as it wishes; Title VII merely insists
that workers and applicants for those jobs be treated without
regard to race or sex. The ADA goes beyond Title VII by
requiring employers to restructure the jobs themselves." 29 This
is in keeping with the notion that the ADA aims to affirmatively
level the playing field, while Title VII merely issues a
nondiscrimination mandate.3° These differences, structural and
substantive, are critical to grasp, and they form the baseline for
the further analysis of reasonable accommodation.
But taking students' thinking on these issues from abstract
to concrete requires more specific examples. One that I have
found particularly useful in class is to consider the plight of a
specific employee in several different contexts and
predicaments-a pharmacist. We thus consider the case of the
pharmacist in need of accommodation. A Westlaw search of the
word "pharmacist" within the same paragraph as "reasonable
accommodation," which could be referring to a request made
pursuant to Title VII or to the ADA, yields thirty-three results
as of September 2017. In class, we consider the narrative of a
pharmacist who may be working in any number of different
work environments (small pharmacies, large chain pharmacies),
in any part of the country (remote versus cosmopolitan, places
where there may be greater diversity of beliefs or greater access
to other pharmacies versus less), with any number of requests
for accommodation, be they religion- or disability-based. By
focusing on the pharmacist, and by envisioning her with any
number of accommodation needs and in any number of
professional settings, the operational rules that govern different
types of employment discrimination scenarios are drawn into
sharper focus.
When the focus is on the mandate that employers afford
employees reasonable religious accommodation under Title VII,
attention naturally turns, as it does in many discussions of the
assertion of religious liberty, to the tensions inherent in a
28. Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1197, 1199-1200 (2003).
29. Id. at 1202.
30. Id. at 1200.
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scenario in which one person's assertion of religious liberty is
seen as an incursion into other's (or society's) rights or
interests. 31 So, for example, a pharmacist may seek to be exempt
from dispensing certain types of medications because doing so
would conflict with her religious beliefs. This medication may
include various forms of birth control, emergency contraception
taken after intercourse to prevent a pregnancy, and hormoneblocking drugs taken by transsexuals in the midst of
transitioning. This exemption would require the provision of
this medication by another willing employee when the employee
is on duty. Under the precepts of Title VII jurisprudence, the
requested exemption would be evaluated as a proposed
reasonable accommodation, and the pharmacist's employer
would need to argue that the accommodation is not reasonable,
but rather that it confers an undue burden on it. 32
In any event, the ensuing analysis is fact-intensive.
Typically, courts adjudicating the issue of reasonable religious
accommodations factor into their analyses things like the costs
imposed on the employer by the accommodation and its relative
ability to defray those costs, 33 whether the employer would have
to violate its own clearly established seniority system, as well as
harms of various sorts that may be conferred on third parties or
society at large as a result of the accommodation. 34 Thus, it may
very well be the case that a pharmacist with essentially the
31. See e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85-86 (1977).
32. See e.g. U.S. v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d
Cir. 1990) (discussing the different defenses to alleging failure to reasonably
accommodate).
33. See e.g., Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 69 (taking into consideration the
fact that allowing the employee to work four days a week and observe Sabbath,
would have, among other things, required TWA to employ someone not regularly
assigned to work Saturdays and pay premium wages); see also Bd. of Educ. for Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 887 (acknowledging that the sort of ''de minimis cost"
addressed is usually economic in nature); cf Enforcement Guidance, supra note 8 ("If
there are two possible reasonable accommodations, and one costs more or is more
burdensome than the other, the employer may choose the less expensive or
burdensome accommodation as long as its effective ....").
34. See e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002) ( "[Ijn the
context of a Title VII religious discrimination case, an employer need not adapt to an
employee's special worship schedule as a 'reasonable accommodation' where doing so
would conflict with the seniority rights of other employees."); Trans World Airlines,
432 U.S. at 79 ("[W]e cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreedupon seniority system must give way when necessary to accommodate religious
observances."); see also Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 894 (holding
that a state statute prohibiting teachers from wearing religious garb in class did not
violate the Muslim teacher's Title VII rights where the statute advanced a
compelling state interest in maintaining appearance of religious neutrality).
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same job description and title may fare differently when
requesting that another pharmacist handle the provision of
certain prescriptions because of anything from the location of the
pharmacy, to its size, to its resources.
However, some states have found the religious liberties at
stake too vital to be denied in any event, and have passed socalled "refusal clauses" or "conscience clauses," pieces of
legislation initially enacted in the wake of Roe v. Wade,3 6 which
rendered unenforceable all state laws that outlawed abortion
because they were seen to violate a constitutional right to
privacy. 36 These conscience clauses initially permitted doctors
and other health care providers to refuse to perform or assist in
an abortion. 37 Now, some states have passed versions that
afford pharmacists the right to refuse to engage in the provision
of certain services and the dispensing of certain prescription
drugs when doing so would violate individual religious beliefs.38
In both 2014 and 2016, Senator Cory Booker introduced the
"Access to Birth Control Act" bill, 39 which would compel all
pharmacists in the United States to dispense emergency
contraception, but there is a great deal of resistance to what
many see as a trammeling of the right to abide by one's
conscience while retaining one's job. 40 Presently, several states,
including Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, and Idaho have enacted
laws permitting pharmacists to refuse to dispense emergency
contraception drugs. 41 Without explicitly naming pharmacists,
other states, including Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and
Tennessee have enacted more general conscience clauses. 42
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit upheld as constitutional
Washington State's rules requiring a pharmacy to deliver or
dispense drugs, and including secular but not religious
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
Pharmacist Con.science Clauses: Laws and Information (May 2012),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/pharmacist-conscience-clauses-laws-andinformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/CK6P-JU99] [hereinafter "Pharmacist Conscience
Clauses''].
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
37. See Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, supra note 35.
38. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-304(4)-(5) (2012) (allowing physicians and
pharmacists to refuse to provide contraceptive procedures or supplies); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-6-102(7), (9) (2018).
39. See S. 2960, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); see also H.R. 2567, 115th Cong. (20172018) (Access to Birth Control Act filed by Rep. Maloney, Carolyn B.).
40. See Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, supra note 35.
41. Pharmacist Con.science Clauses, supra note 35.
42. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, supra note 35.
35.

LEGISLATURES,
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exemptions. 43 According to the Court:
We recognize that there is a "trend of protecting
conscientious objectors to abortions," . . . and that
most-but not all-states do not require pharmacies
to deliver prescriptions, such as Plan B and ella, in a
timely manner. On balance, however, we are
unconvinced that the right to own, operate, or work
at a licensed professional business free from
regulations requiring the business to engage in
activities that one sincerely believes leads to the
taking of human life is "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." . . .
Accordingly, we decline to
recognize a new fundamental right. 44
The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari, generating
a strident dissent from Justice Alito, in which he declared the
declination "ominous." 45 This case was seen as contrasting
interestingly with the sentiment of the Supreme Court in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 46 in which the Supreme
Court allowed a for-profit, closely-held private corporation to
claim an exemption based on the owners' religious convictions
from a regulation adopted by the US Department of Health and
Human Services under the Affordable Care Act. 47
The
regulation required employers to cover certain contraceptives for
their female employees, and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Stormans drew comparisons to the Supreme Court's opinion, 48
with The Atlantic noting that "[o]n the surface, the Hobby Lobby
and Stormans cases seem similar: Both involve private
businesses whose religious owners object to laws requiring them
to deal with contraception."49 The paper asked what had
happened in those two years that made the Supreme Court
43. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 {2016).
44. Id. at 1087-88 (internal citations omitted).
45. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 {2016) {Alito, J., dissenting).
46. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
47. Id. at 2759.
48. See Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1075 n.4.
49. Emma Green, Euen Christian Pharmacists Haue to Stock Plan B, THE
ATLANTIC (Jun. 29, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016
/06/pharmacists-have-to-sell-emergency-contracptioneven-if-it-violates-theirreligious-beliefs/489182/ [https://perma.cc/9GVY-QRN9].
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change course so much since Hobby Lobby.so
The obvious answer, of course, is the changes in the
composition of the Supreme Court's membership. 51 Even after
Justice Scalia's death, the Court might have taken up the issue,
since it only takes four Justices to procure a grant of certiorari. 52
However, those who would support one might have feared that
without a fifth vote to reverse, a four and four affITmance of the
Ninth Circuit would have ensued. 53 And, interestingly, only
Justice Alito spoke out about the denial. 54 But was there also a
combination of cultural, political, and other environmental
changes that had changed the direction of the proverbial
political winds on this issue? And it should be noted that we can
never really draw broad conclusions from the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari. The Court will sometimes leave issues to
percolate longer in the lower courts without voicing a clear
opinion when the first opportunity presents itself.
On one side, pharmacists' associations and religious
liberties groups took up the mantle of the objecting pharmacists,
both in the case and in the public debate.5 5 They argued that
despite the centrality that had been accorded individual
assertions of religious liberty and conviction by state laws, with
an affirmative mandate like Washington's, the sheer inability of
small pharmacies to accommodate individuals while abiding by
the mandate could pose a threat to the continued employment of
individual pharmacists. 56 On the other side, groups like the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU') vehemently defended
the rules requiring pharmacies to deliver/dispense drugs despite
their owners' religious objections. 57 They argued that a woman
in need of some of the medications at issue might be dissuaded
from using them or otherwise harmed if she were forced to seek
them at another pharmacy. 5 8
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; Supreme Court Declines To Hear Case About Religious Pharmacy
Turning Women Away, AMERICAN C.L. UNION (June 28, 2016),
https://www.aclu.org/news/supreme-court-declines-hear-case-about-religiouspharmacy-turning-women-away [https://perma.cc/BL8K-BUJ6] [hereinaRer
"Supreme Court Declines".]
58. Green, supra note 49; Supreme Court Declines, supra note 57.
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It must also not be forgotten that the litigation in Hobby
Lobby was brought under RFRA, 59 whereas in Stormans, he
brought a challenge to a state regulation, which could not have
been litigated under RFRA. 60 I encourage my students to
question and debate whether, as Judge Alito intimated in his
dissent from the denial of certiorari, religious liberty is under
attack, or whether the public health concerns attendant to
compelling the immediate availability of Plan B and similar
drugs need to prevail. 61 A similar debate took place in the
United Kingdom ("UK'') recently, starting in December of 2016. 62
At that time, the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC),
promulgated draft standards and guidance that inserted a "duty
to dispense" where there had previously been a "right to refer." 63
This was termed a "significant change" by the GPhC. 64 The
draft guidance generated a great deal of input from groups and
individuals that centered around the competing interests of
religious liberties on the part of some and public health and
access to prescriptions. 65 On June 22, 2017, the final guidance
issued stated that individual pharmacists would retain the
prerogative to refer customers to see other pharmacists when
they needed prescriptions filled for, among other things,
abortifacient or hormone-blocking drugs. 66
This material is a springboard into a discussion of the
concept of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA and
59. Green, supra note 49.
60. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 n.4.
61. See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alita, J.
dissenting).
62. GEN. PHARMACEUTICAL COUNS., Consultation on Religi,on, Personal Values
and Beliefs, (Dec. 2016), https://www.pharmacyregulation.org
/sites/default/files/consu1tation_on_religion_personal_values_and_beliefs_decerober_2
016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F94Z-SNT7] (hereinafter "Consultation on Religi,on"); see
also Philippa Taylor, Good News for freedom of Conscience in the UK, CMF BLOG
(June 26, 2017), http://www.cmtblog.org.uk/2017/06/26/good-news-for-freedom-ofconcious-in-the-uk/ [https://perma.cc/A7G4-H567].
63. Dr. Peter Saunders, Regulator's Proposal to Remove Pharmacists'
Conscience Rights is Unethical, Unnecessary and Quite Possibly Rlegal, CMF BLOG
(Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.cmflblog.org.uk/2017/02/21/regulators-proposal-toremove-pharmacists-conscience-rights-is-unethical-unneccesary-and-quite-possiblyillegal/ [https://perma.cc/3XE7-KSC7].
64. Consultation on Religion, supra note 62.
65. Saunders, supra note 63.
66. GEN. PHARMACEUTICAL COUNS., In Practice: Guidance on Religion, Personal
Values and Beliefs, (June 2017),
https://www.pharmacyregulation.org/sites/default/files/in_practice_guidance_on_relig
ion_personal_values_and~beliefs. pdf (https://perma.cc/VB2Z-L98V].
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under Title VII. 67 Drawn into sharper focus, the plight of the
pharmacist who cannot perform all that is asked of her boils
down largely to the workings of the respective statutes
employed, their goals, and their construction by courts.
Structurally, what is going on in each scenario is somewhat
similar; Title VII and the ADA each seek to combat
discrimination, often rational or for "economic reasons," and
often in the form of a failure to accommodate. 68 It is useful,
though, to have students confronted with the pharmacist
scenarios examine the discrimination being combated in each
side by side and come to conclusions about the structures,
objectives, and constructions of the statutes at play.
Once we have reviewed religious discrimination claims
potentially brought by a pharmacist, my class looks at the plight
of the same pharmacist who seeks permission to .abstain from
performing part of what would normally be considered part of
her job duties, but this time, due to a disability. Fortunately,
this kind of case has already come to court, so after we speculate
about various hypothetical outcomes, we can look at some actual
ones. 69
In 201 7, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Stevens
v. Rite Aid Corp. that a pharmacist whose trypan phobia, or fear
of needles, could not expect to be accommodated under the ADA
by bypassing his employer's policy that required pharmacists to
administer immunization injections to customers by having
someone else perform that part of his job for him. 70
Immunizations, however, were listed in Rite Aid's job description
for its pharmacists as one of their "essential duties and
responsibilities" for pharmacists. 71 According to the court, the
plaintiff was not properly deemed, as the statute required him to
be to claim relief, a "qualified individual" who, "with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." 72 The court held that it was compelled to find that the
immunization injections were an essential job requirement for
67. Gee, supra note 16, at 1140.
68. Gee, supra note 16, at 1149.
69. See e.g., Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 851 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2017).
70. Id. at 228, 231.
71. Id. at 229.
72. Id. at 229 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012)). The court ultimately
concluding that no 'juror could reasonably conclude that Stevens was 'qualified to
perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable
accommodation."' Id. at 231.

2018]

RELIGION AND DISABILITY ACCOMODATION

261

Rite Aid pharmacists.73 Specifically, the court found that the
plaintiffs proposals "that Rite Aid could have either hired a
nurse to give immunization injections for him or assigned him to
a
dual-pharmacist
location
do
not
propose
true
accommodations," because "[t]hose steps would be exemptions
that would have involved other employees performing Stevens'
essential immunization duties," and "Rite Aid was not required
to grant Stevens these exemptions."74
In Buser v. Eckerd Corp., 75 a federal district court in 2015
looked at a similar claim by a pharmacist with Parkinson's
disease who could not administer injections due to tremors that
he experienced. 76 The plaintiff there sought exemption from his
employer's vaccination requirement, or, alternately, that he be
furnished with an automatic injector to permit him to give
injections without using an exposed needle. 77
The court
determined that there was sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to
survive summary judgment on, among other things, whether
giving immunizations were an essential function of his job. 78
"However, the court also held [that the] plaintiff failed to adduce
sufficient evidence showing a reasonable accommodation existed,
if immunization was determined to be an essential function of
his job." 79
Interestingly, whereas there has been legislative
intervention on the religious discrimination front, the few recent
ADA cases brought by pharmacists have tended not to go the
plaintiffs' way. 80 We discuss what this means in terms of the
law's treatment of religion, and in spite of the broader
construction of the reasonable accommodation mandate in the
ADA. Using the workplace of a pharmacy and these scenarios as
a springboard, we will then discuss the differences between the
law's provisions for and handling of religious discrimination as
opposed to disability discrimination more broadly. I note for my
students, that numerous scholars have observed that the
73. Id. at 231.
74. Id. ("Moreover, as the District Court noted, Stevens failed to show that a
vacant position at a dual-pharmacist store existed at the time of his termination.").
75.

2015 WL 1438618 (E.D.N.C. 2015).

76. Id. at *l.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80, Denise Johnson, Why Claims Under American with Disabilities Act are
Rising, INS. J. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
national/2016/10/07/42877 4.htm [https://perma.cc/K8KN-8N99].
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reasonable accommodation mandate of Title VII has been
construed more broadly in favor of employers than that of the
ADA, 8 1 with some even calling for Title VII to be amended to
adopt the ADA's more generous-to-plaintiffs reasonable
accommodation provision. 82
Stephen Gee, another scholar,
however, disagrees starkly with this call, citing everything from
the immutability of disability as opposed to religion to
Establishment Clause impediments for the proposition. 83 Gee
argues that "[t]he ADA is afforded a stronger accommodation
standard, [and a] ... more preferential Title VII standard could
be struck down in violation of the Establishment Clause due to
the potential governmental entanglement with religion." 84
The fact of the matter is, however, that the two provisions
in the two statutes guaranteeing entitlement to a "reasonable
accommodation," have some stark differences between them, 85
and my goal is always to see if I can elicit these differences from
students as they study the two side-by-side. Despite the fact that
both the ADA and Title VII were drafted and enacted to
eradicate workplace discrimination against groups that would be
particularly susceptible to and uniquely harmed by it, there is
guidance stretching back a long way that would predicate
divergent interpretations of terms like ''reasonable" or "undue
hardship." 86
As stated, the centerpiece terms of the respective statutes,
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" are to be

81. Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to
Provide Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63
ARK. L. REV. 515, 530---31 (2010); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., &ading Amendments and
Expansions of Title VII Narrowly, 95 B.U.L. REV. 781, 797-98 (2015); Schuchman,
supra note 20, at 754.
82. Blair, supra note 81, at 530-31; Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and
Third-Party Harms, 17 FEDERALIST Soc'y REV. 50, 58 (2016) ("consider, for example,
the duty of reasonable accommodation of disabilities. The legislature should have as
much latitude to protect religion as it has to protect these other important values.");
see also Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of &ligion: An Update and A
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992) (''The legislature
should have as much latitude to protect the exercise of religion that it has to protect
other important values in life .... Congress struck the balance in Title VII by
requiring 'reasonabl[e] accommodat[ion],' short of 'undue hardship' to the employerthe same statutory standard that it applies to accommo:lation of persons with
disabilities.").
83. Gee, supra note 16, at 1131.
84. Id. at 1167.
85. Id. at 1148.
86. Id. at 1142.
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construed quite differently. 87 As one scholar has observed:
Congress specifically rejected Hardison 's de
minimis standard for the interpretation of "undue
hardship" under the ADA, stating that the ADA
requires a significantly higher standard than that
created by the Supreme Court for Title VII. Second,
religious beliefs (which reflect a choice) and
disabilities (which do not) are fundamentally
different "animals," so a law designed to protect one
may not be a fully appropriate comparative
instrument for the other. Thirdly, "disability'' carries
a certain stigma that we initially may be reluctant to
apply to religion, as many people consider disabled
individuals to be substantially incapacitated by their
disabilities and unable to participate in normal life
activities. 88
Each of these facets of the premise for the different
construction informs and animates our discussion, but we
discuss the fact-intensive nature of each case and how critical
which jurisdiction a pharmacist works in can be, as everything
from state-specific protections to benches differently poised on
the issue of accommodation in any number of contexts can be
determinative of what happens in a case or a challenge. Our
class winds up with a discussion about societal and judicial
attitudes toward religion and the protection of religious liberties
and some projections about whether the status of things will
change, and why.

IV. CONCLUSION
After years of teaching the concept of "reasonable
accommodation" in two different contexts at two different points
in the semester, I decided to revisit one while covering the other.
I did this by focusing my lesson on the plight of a pharmacist in
search of an accommodation that would excuse her from doing
part of her job, but in a variety of contexts and scenarios. The
87. Id. at 1135.
88. Laura E. Watson, (Un)reasonable Religwus Accommodation: The Argument
for an "Essential Functions" Provision Under Title VII, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 70-71
(2016); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL
L. REV. 85, 89 (2016).
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result has been a more thoughtful, productive class discussion
about everything from changing attitudes toward religious
liberty, to comparative developments and approaches toward
religious liberty in the United States and abroad, to the
differences between Title VII and the ADA.

